Introduction
This document is an introduction to the third version of the Internet-Standard Management Framework, termed the SNMP version 3 Management Framework (SNMPv3) and has multiple purposes. First, it describes the relationship between the SNMP version 3 (SNMPv3) specifications and the specifications of the SNMP version 1 (SNMPv1) Management Framework, the SNMP version 2 (SNMPv2) Management Framework, and the Community-based Administrative Framework for SNMPv2.
Second, it provides a roadmap to the multiple documents which contain the relevant specifications.
Third, this document provides a brief easy-to-read summary of the contents of each of the relevant specification documents.
This document is intentionally tutorial in nature and, as such, may occasionally be "guilty" of oversimplification. In the event of a conflict or contradiction between this document and the more detailed documents for which this document is a roadmap, the specifications in the more detailed documents shall prevail.
Further, the detailed documents attempt to maintain separation between the various component modules in order to specify welldefined interfaces between them. This roadmap document, however, takes a different approach and attempts to provide an integrated view of the various component modules in the interest of readability.
This document is a work product of the SNMPv3 Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [1] .
The Internet Standard Management Framework
The third version of the Internet Standard Management Framework (the SNMPv3 Framework) is derived from and builds upon both the original Internet-Standard Management Framework (SNMPv1) and the second Internet-Standard Management Framework (SNMPv2).
All versions (SNMPv1, SNMPv2, and SNMPv3) of the Internet Standard Management SNMP Framework share the same basic structure and components. Furthermore, all versions of the specifications of the Internet Standard Management Framework follow the same architecture. * several (typically many) managed nodes, each with an SNMP entity which provides remote access to management instrumentation (traditionally called an agent);
* at least one SNMP entity with management applications (typically called a manager), * a management protocol used to convey management information between the SNMP entities, and * management information.
The management protocol is used to convey management information between SNMP entities such as managers and agents.
This basic structure is common to all versions of the Internet Standard Management Framework; i.e., SNMPv1, SNMPv2, and SNMPv3.
Architecture of the Internet Standard Management Framework
The specifications of the Internet Standard Management Framework are based on a modular architecture. This framework is more than just a protocol for moving data. It consists of:
* a data definition language, * definitions of management information (the Management Information Base, or MIB), * a protocol definition, and * security and administration.
Over time, as the Framework has evolved from SNMPv1, through SNMPv2, to SNMPv3, the definitions of each of these architectural components have become richer and more clearly defined, but the fundamental architecture has remained consistent.
One prime motivator for this modularity was to enable the ongoing evolution of the Framework, as is documented in RFC 1052 [2] . When originally envisioned, this capability was to be used to ease the transition from SNMP-based management of internets to management based on OSI protocols. To this end, the framework was architected
with a protocol-independent data definition language and Management Information Base along with a MIB-independent protocol. This separation was designed to allow the SNMP-based protocol to be replaced without requiring the management information to be redefined or reinstrumented. History has shown that the selection of this architecture was the right decision for the wrong reason --it turned out that this architecture has eased the transition from SNMPv1 to SNMPv2 and from SNMPv2 to SNMPv3 rather than easing the transition away from management based on the Simple Network Management Protocol.
The SNMPv3 Framework builds and extends these architectural principles by:
* building on these four basic architectural components, in some cases incorporating them from the SNMPv2 Framework by reference, and * by using these same layering principles in the definition of new capabilities in the security and administration portion of the architecture.
Those who are familiar with the architecture of the SNMPv1 Management Framework and the SNMPv2 Management Framework will find many familiar concepts in the architecture of the SNMPv3 Management Framework. However, in some cases, the terminology may be somewhat different.
The SNMPv1 Management Framework
The original Internet-Standard Network Management Framework (SNMPv1) is defined in the following documents:
* STD 16, RFC 1155 [3] which defines the Structure of Management Information (SMI), the mechanisms used for describing and naming objects for the purpose of management.
* STD 16, RFC 1212 [4] which defines a more concise description mechanism for describing and naming management information objects, but which is wholly consistent with the SMI.
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Additionally, two documents are generally considered companions to these three:
* STD 17, RFC 1213 [6] which contains definitions for the base set of management information * RFC 1215 [7] defines a concise description mechanism for defining event notifications, which are called traps in the SNMPv1 protocol. It also specifies the generic traps from RFC 1157 in the concise notation.
These documents describe the four parts of the first version of the SNMP Framework.
The SNMPv1 Data Definition Language
The first two and the last document, i.e., RFCs 1155, 1212, and 1215, describe the SNMPv1 data definition language and are often collectively referred to as "SMIv1". Note that due to the initial requirement that the SMI be protocol-independent, the first two SMI documents do not provide a means for defining event notifications (traps). Instead, the SNMP protocol document defines a few standardized event notifications (generic traps) and provides a means for additional event notifications to be defined. The last document specifies a straight-forward approach towards defining event notifications used with the SNMPv1 protocol. At the time that it was written, use of traps in the Internet-Standard network management framework was controversial. As such, RFC 1215 was put forward with the status of "Informational", which was never updated because it was believed that the second version of the SNMP Framework would replace the first version.
Management Information
The data definition language described in the first two documents was first used to define the now-historic MIB-I as specified in RFC 1066 [8] , and was subsequently used to define MIB-II as specified in RFC 1213 [6] .
Later, after the publication of MIB-II, a different approach to the management information definition was taken from the earlier approach of having a single committee staffed by generalists work on a single document to define the Internet-Standard MIB. Rather, many mini-MIB documents were produced in a parallel and distributed fashion by groups chartered to produce a specification for a focused portion of the Internet-Standard MIB and staffed by personnel with expertise in those particular areas ranging from various aspects of network management, to system management, and application management. However, while the SNMPv1 Framework anticipated the definition of multiple authentication schemes, it did not define any such schemes other than a trivial authentication scheme based on community strings. This was a known fundamental weakness in the SNMPv1 Framework but it was thought at that time that the definition of commercial grade security might be contentious in its design and difficult to get approved because "security" means many different things to different people. To that end, and because some users do not require strong authentication, the SNMPv1 architected an authentication service as a separate block to be defined "later" and the SNMPv3 Framework provides an architecture for use within that block as well as a definition for its subsystems.
The SNMPv2 Management Framework
The SNMPv2 Management Framework is described in [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] and coexistence and transition issues relating to SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 are discussed in [15] .
SNMPv2 provides several advantages over SNMPv1, including:
* expanded data types (e.g., 64 bit counter)
* improved efficiency and performance (get-bulk operator)
* confirmed event notification (inform operator) * richer error handling (errors and exceptions) * improved sets, especially row creation and deletion * fine tuning of the data definition language However, the SNMPv2 Framework, as described in these documents, is incomplete in that it does not meet the original design goals of the SNMPv2 project. The unmet goals included provision of security and administration delivering so-called "commercial grade" security with:
* authentication: origin identification, message integrity, and some aspects of replay protection;
* privacy: confidentiality;
* authorization and access control; and * suitable remote configuration and administration capabilities for these features.
The SNMPv3 Management Framework, as described in this document and the companion documents, addresses these significant deficiencies.
The SNMPv3 Working Group
This document, and its companion documents, were produced by the SNMPv3 Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task in a way which is useful for users who wish to use SNMPv3 to manage networks, the systems that make up those networks, and the applications which reside on those systems, including manager-toagent, agent-to-manager, and manager-to-manager transactions.
In the several years prior to the chartering of the Working Group, there were a number of activities aimed at incorporating security and other improvements to SNMP. These efforts included: Each of these efforts incorporated commercial grade, industrial strength security including authentication, privacy, authorization, view-based access control, and administration, including remote configuration.
These efforts fed the development of the SNMPv2 Management Framework as described in RFCs 1902 -1908. However, the Framework described in those RFCs had no standards-based security and administrative framework of its own; rather, it was associated with multiple security and administrative frameworks, including:
* "The Community-based SNMPv2" (SNMPv2c) as described in RFC 1901 [16] , * "SNMPv2u" as described in RFCs 1909 and 1910, and * "SNMPv2*."
SNMPv2c had the most support within the IETF but had no security and administration whereas both SNMPv2u and SNMPv2* had security but lacked a consensus of support within the IETF.
The SNMPv3 Working Group was chartered to produce a single set of specifications for the next generation of SNMP, based upon a convergence of the concepts and technical elements of SNMPv2u and SNMPv2*, as was suggested by an advisory team which was formed to provide a single recommended approach for SNMP evolution. In so doing, the Working Group charter defined the following objectives:
* accommodate the wide range of operational environments with differing management demands;
* facilitate the need to transition from previous, multiple protocols to SNMPv3;
* facilitate the ease of setup and maintenance activities.
In the initial work of the SNMPv3 Working Group, the group focused on security and administration, including:
* authentication and privacy, * authorization and view-based access control, and * standards-based remote configuration of the above.
The SNMPv3 Working Group did not "reinvent the wheel", but reused the SNMPv2 Draft Standard documents, i.e., RFCs 1902 through 1908 for those portions of the design that were outside the focused scope.
Rather, the primary contributors to the SNMPv3 Working Group, and the Working Group in general, devoted their considerable efforts to addressing the missing link --security and administration --and in the process made invaluable contributions to the state-of-the-art of management.
They produced a design based on a modular architecture with evolutionary capabilities with emphasis on layering. As a result, SNMPv3 can be thought of as SNMPv2 with additional security and administration capabilities.
In doing so, the Working Group achieved the goal of producing a single specification which has not only the endorsement of the IETF but also has security and administration.
SNMPv3 Framework Module Specifications
The specification of the SNMPv3 Management Framework is partitioned in a modular fashion among several documents. The SNMPv3 Framework augments those specifications with specifications for security and administration for SNMPv3.
The documents which specify the SNMPv3 Management Framework follow the same architecture as those of the prior versions and can be organized for expository purposes into four main categories as follows:
* the data definition language, * Management Information Base (MIB) modules, * protocol operations, and * security and administration.
The first three sets of documents are incorporated from SNMPv2. The documents in the fourth set are new to SNMPv3, but, as described previously, build on significant prior related works.
Data Definition Language
The specifications of the data definition language include STD 58, RFC 2578, "Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)" [17] , and related specifications. STD 58, RFC 2580, "Conformance Statements for SMIv2" [19] , defines the format for compliance statements which are used for describing requirements for agent implementations and capability statements which can be used to document the characteristics of particular implementations.
The term "SMIv2" is somewhat ambiguous because users of the term intend it to have at least two different meanings. Sometimes the term is used to refer the entire data definition language of STD 58, defined collectively in RFCs 2578 -2580 whereas at other times it is used to refer to only the portion of the data definition language defined in RFC 2578. This ambiguity is unfortunate but is rarely a significant problem in practice.
MIB Modules
MIB modules usually contain object definitions, may contain definitions of event notifications, and sometimes include compliance statements specified in terms of appropriate object and event notification groups. As such, MIB modules define the management information maintained by the instrumentation in managed nodes, made remotely accessible by management agents, conveyed by the management protocol, and manipulated by management applications.
MIB modules are defined according to the rules defined in the documents which specify the data definition language, principally the SMI as supplemented by the related specifications.
There is a large and growing number of standards-track MIB modules, as defined in the periodically updated "Internet Official Protocol Standards" list [20] . As of this writing, there are more than 100 standards-track MIB modules with a total number of defined objects exceeding 10,000. In addition, there is an even larger and growing number of enterprise-specific MIB modules defined unilaterally by various vendors, research groups, consortia, and the like resulting in an unknown and virtually uncountable number of defined objects.
In general, management information defined in any MIB module, regardless of the version of the data definition language used, can be used with any version of the protocol. For example, MIB modules defined in terms of the SNMPv1 SMI (SMIv1) are compatible with the SNMPv3 Management Framework and can be conveyed by the protocols specified therein. Furthermore, MIB modules defined in terms of the SNMPv2 SMI (SMIv2) are compatible with SNMPv1 protocol operations and can be conveyed by it. However, there is one noteworthy exception: the Counter64 datatype which can be defined in a MIB module defined in SMIv2 format but which cannot be conveyed by an SNMPv1 protocol engine. It can be conveyed by an SNMPv2 or an SNMPv3 engine, but cannot be conveyed by an engine which exclusively supports SNMPv1.
Protocol Operations and Transport Mappings
The specifications for the protocol operations and transport mappings of the SNMPv3 Framework are incorporated by reference to the two SNMPv2 Framework documents which have subsequently been updated.
The specification for protocol operations is found in STD 62, RFC 3416, "Version 2 of the Protocol Operations for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [21] .
The SNMPv3 Framework is designed to allow various portions of the architecture to evolve independently. For example, it might be possible for a new specification of protocol operations to be defined within the Framework to allow for additional protocol operations.
The specification of transport mappings is found in STD 62, RFC 3417, "Transport Mappings for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [22] .
SNMPv3 Security and Administration
The document series pertaining to SNMPv3 Security and Administration defined by the SNMPv3 Working Group consists of seven documents at this time:
RFC 3410, "Introduction and Applicability Statements for the Internet-Standard Management Framework", which is this document.
STD 62, RFC 3411, "An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks" [23] , describes the overall architecture with special emphasis on the architecture for security and administration.
STD 62, RFC 3412, "Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [24] , describes the possibility of multiple message processing models and the dispatcher portion that can be a part of an SNMP protocol engine.
STD 62, RFC 3413, "Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications" [25] , describes the five initial types of applications that can be associated with an SNMPv3 engine and their elements of procedure. 
Document Summaries
The following sections provide brief summaries of each document with slightly more detail than is provided in the overviews above.
Structure of Management Information
Management information is viewed as a collection of managed objects, residing in a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base (MIB). Collections of related objects are defined in MIB modules. These modules are written in the SNMP data definition language, which evolved from an adapted subset of OSI's Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [29] language. STD 58, RFCs 2578, 2579, 2580, collectively define the data definition language, specify the base data types for objects, specify a core set of short-hand specifications for data types called textual conventions, and specify a few administrative assignments of object identifier (OID) values.
The SMI is divided into three parts: module definitions, object definitions, and notification definitions.
(1) Module definitions are used when describing information modules. An ASN.1 macro, MODULE-IDENTITY, is used to convey concisely the semantics of an information module.
(2) Object definitions are used when describing managed objects. An ASN.1 macro, OBJECT-TYPE, is used to convey concisely the syntax and semantics of a managed object. As noted earlier, the term "SMIv2" is somewhat ambiguous because users of the term intend it to have at least two different meanings. Sometimes the term is used to refer to the entire data definition language of STD 58, defined collectively in RFCs 2578 -2580 whereas at other times it is used to refer to only the portion of the data definition language defined in RFC 2578. This ambiguity is unfortunate but is rarely a significant problem in practice. * IMPORTS to allow the specification of items that are used in a MIB module, but defined in another MIB module.
* MODULE-IDENTITY to specify for a MIB module a description and administrative information such as contact and revision history.
* OBJECT-IDENTITY and OID value assignments to specify an OID value.
* OBJECT-TYPE to specify the data type, status, and the semantics of managed objects.
* SEQUENCE type assignment to list the columnar objects in a table.
* NOTIFICATION-TYPE construct to specify an event notification.
Textual Conventions
When designing a MIB module, it is often useful to specify, in a short-hand way, the semantics for a set of objects with similar behavior. This is done by defining a new data type using a base data type specified in the SMI. Each new type has a different name, and specifies a base type with more restrictive semantics. These newly defined types are termed textual conventions, and are used for the convenience of humans reading a MIB module and potentially by "intelligent" management applications. It is the purpose of STD 58, [18] , to define the construct, TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, of the data definition language used to define such new types and to specify an initial set of textual conventions available to all MIB modules.
Conformance Statements
It may be useful to define the acceptable lower-bounds of implementation, along with the actual level of implementation achieved. It is the purpose of STD 58, RFC 2580, Conformance Statements for SMIv2 [19] , to define the constructs of the data definition language used for these purposes. There are two kinds of constructs:
(1) Compliance statements are used when describing requirements for agents with respect to object and event notification definitions. The MODULE-COMPLIANCE construct is used to convey concisely such requirements.
(2) Capability statements are used when describing capabilities of agents with respect to object and event notification definitions. The AGENT-CAPABILITIES construct is used to convey concisely such capabilities.
Finally, collections of related objects and collections of related event notifications are grouped together to form a unit of conformance. The OBJECT-GROUP construct is used to convey concisely the objects in and the semantics of an object group. The NOTIFICATION-GROUP construct is used to convey concisely the event notifications in and the semantics of an event notification group.
Protocol Operations
The management protocol provides for the exchange of messages which convey management information between the agents and the management stations. The form of these messages is a message "wrapper" which encapsulates a Protocol Data Unit (PDU).
It is the purpose of STD 62, RFC 3416, "Version 2 of the Protocol Operations for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [21] , to define the operations of the protocol with respect to the sending and receiving of the PDUs.
Transport Mappings
SNMP messages may be used over a variety of protocol suites. It is the purpose of STD 62, RFC 3417, "Transport Mappings for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [22] , to define how SNMP messages
map onto an initial set of transport domains. Other mappings may be defined in the future.
Although several mappings are defined, the mapping onto UDP is the preferred mapping. As such, to provide for the greatest level of interoperability, systems which choose to deploy other mappings should also provide for proxy service to the UDP mapping.
Protocol Instrumentation
It is the purpose of STD 62, RFC 3418, "Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [30] , to define managed objects which describe the behavior of portions of an SNMP entity.
Architecture / Security and Administration
It is the purpose of STD 62, RFC 3411, "An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks" [23] , to define an architecture for specifying Management Frameworks. While addressing general architectural issues, it focuses on aspects related to security and administration. It defines a number of terms used throughout the SNMPv3 Management Framework and, in so doing, clarifies and extends the naming of:
* engines and applications, * entities (service providers such as the engines in agents and managers), * identities (service users), and * management information, including support for multiple logical contexts.
The document contains a small MIB module which is implemented by all authoritative SNMPv3 protocol engines. The USM uses the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [34] in the cipher block chaining mode (CBC) if disclosure protection is desired. Support for DES in the USM is optional, primarily because export and usage restrictions in many countries make it difficult to export and use products which include cryptographic technology.
The document also includes a MIB suitable for remotely monitoring and managing the configuration parameters for the USM, including key distribution and key management.
An entity may provide simultaneous support for multiple security models as well as multiple authentication and privacy protocols. All of the protocols used by the USM are based on pre-placed keys, i.e., private key mechanisms. The SNMPv3 architecture permits the use of symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms and protocols (asymmetric mechanisms are commonly called public key cryptography) but, as of this writing, there are no SNMPv3 security models on the IETF standards track that use public key cryptography.
Work is underway to specify how AES is to be used within the Userbased Security Model (USM). This will be a separate document.
View-based Access Control (VACM)
The purpose of STD 62, RFC 3415, the "View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [27] , is to describe the View-based Access Control Model for use in the SNMP architecture. The VACM can simultaneously be associated in a single engine implementation with multiple Message Processing Models and multiple Security Models.
It is architecturally possible to have multiple, different, Access Control Models active and present simultaneously in a single engine implementation, but this is expected to be *_very_* rare in practice and *_far_* less common than simultaneous support for multiple Message Processing Models and/or multiple Security Models.
SNMPv3 Coexistence and Transition
The purpose of RFC 2576, "Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-Standard Network Management Framework" [28] , is to describe coexistence between the SNMPv3 Management Framework, the SNMPv2 Management Framework, and the original SNMPv1 Management Framework. In particular, this document describes four aspects of coexistence: [5] , and the experimental SNMPv2c specifications described in RFC 1901 [16] were declared Historic due to their weaknesses with respect to security and to send a clear message that the third version of the Internet Standard Management Framework is the framework of choice. The Party-based SNMPv2 (SNMPv2p), SNMPv2u, and SNMPv2* were either declared Historic circa 1995 or were never on the standards track.
On a pragmatic level, it is expected that a number of vendors will continue to produce and users will continue to deploy and use multilingual implementations that support SNMPv1 and/or SNMPv2c as well as SNMPv3. It should be noted that the IETF standards process does not control actions of vendors or users who may choose to promote or deploy historic protocols, such as SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, in spite of known short-comings. However, it is not expected that vendors will produce nor that users will deploy multi-lingual implementations that support the Party-based SNMPv2p (SNMPv2p), SNMPv2u, or SNMPv2*.
Indeed, as described above, one of the SNMPv3 specifications for security and administration, RFC 2576, Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-Standard Management Framework [28] , addresses these issues.
Of course, it is important that users deploying multi-lingual systems with insecure protocols exercise sufficient due diligence to insure that configurations limit access via SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c appropriately, in keeping with the organization's security policy, just as they should carefully limit access granted via SNMPv3 with a security level of no authentication and no privacy which is roughly equivalent from a security point of view. For example, it is probably unwise to allow SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c a greater level of access than is provided to unauthenticated SNMPv3 users, e.g., it does not make sense to guard the front door with armed guards, trained attack dogs, moats and drawbridges while providing unfettered access through an open back door.
The SNMPv1 framework, SNMPv2 framework, and SNMPv2c had limited capabilities for administering the SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c protocols. For example, there are no objects defined to view and configure communities or destinations for notifications (traps and informs). The result has been vendor defined mechanisms for administration that range from proprietary format configuration files that cannot be viewed or configured via SNMP to enterprise specific object definitions. The SNMPv3 framework provides a rich standards-based approach to administration which, by design, can be used for the SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c protocols. Thus, to foster interoperability of administration of SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c protocols in multi-lingual systems, the mechanisms and objects specified in [25] , [27] , and [28] should be used to supplement or replace the equivalent proprietary mechanisms.
Working Group Recommendation
Based on the explanations above, the SNMPv3 Working Group recommends that RFCs 1157, 1441, 1901, 1909 and 1910 be reclassified as Historical documents.
Security Considerations
As this document is primarily a roadmap document, it introduces no new security considerations. The reader is referred to the relevant sections of each of the referenced documents for information about security considerations.
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